Catherine Z. Elgin
Papers on Epistemic Normativity

• Impartiality and Legal Reasoning (Imagination, Emotion, and Virtue in Legal Reasoning ed. Amalya Amaya and Maksymillian Del Mar. London, Hart, 2019, pp. 47-58.)
  Abstract: Any viable legal system should respect two principles.
  Consistency: Like cases should be treated alike.
  Publicity: Justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done.
  These principles set constraints on the roles that emotions, imagination, and virtues can legitimately play in judicial decisions. I explore the ways emotion imagination and virtue might contribute to judicial decision making without violating the constraints.
  
  
• The Epistemic Normativity of Knowing-How (Abel im Dialog: Perspectiven der Zeichen- und Interpretationsphilosophie ed. Ulrich Dirks and Astrid Wagner. Berlin, DeGruyter, 2018, pp. 483-498.)
  
  
• The Commonwealth of Epistemic Ends (The Ethics of Belief ed. Jonathan Matheson. Oxford, 2014, pp. 244-260.)
  
  
• Trustworthiness (Philosophical Papers 27, 2008, pp. 371-387.)
  Abstract: I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is not trustworthy. We ought not use it as a basis for inference or action and ought not give others to believe it. The trustworthiness of a belief, I urge, depends on its being backed by reasons - considerations that other members of the appropriate epistemic community cannot reasonably reject. Trustworthiness is intersubjective. It both depends on and contributes to the evolving cognitive values of an epistemic community.
  
  
• Optional Stops, Foregone Conclusions, and the Value of Argument (Croatian Journal of Philosophy Vol. IV, No. 12, 2004.)
  Abstract: If the point of argument is to produce conviction, an argument for a foregone conclusion is pointless. I maintain, however, that an argument makes a variety of cognitive contributions, even when its conclusion is already believed. It exhibits warrant. It affords reasons that we can impart to others. It identifies bases for agreement among parties who otherwise disagree. It underwrites confidence, by showing how vulnerable warrant is under changes in background assumptions. Multiple arguments for the same conclusion show how our beliefs hang together.
  
  
• What's the Use? (The Hedgehog Review Vol. 3, No. 3, 2001, pp. 9-25.)